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For Reid the perception of smell, taste, sound, temperature, texture, and color all
proceed according to what has come to be known as ‘the Standard Schema’: the
quality of the object impresses itself upon our bodies; this physical impression
gives rise to a sensation; and this sensation, in turn, “suggests” the quality of the
object, resulting thereby in a conception of the quality and a conviction in its
existence. All interpreters of Reid agree in this. In fact, they also agree that the
tactile perception of shape proceeds according to the Standard Schema. In “Reid
on the Perception of Visible Figure”, I defend the unpopular view that for Reid the
Standard Schema describes, also, the visual perception of perspectival shapes,
what Reid calls “visible figures”. I claim that Reid takes visual sensations to
suggest both color and figure, and so holds that visible figure is indeed suggested
by a sensation, just like every other perceived quality. In their very interesting
article (against my objections), Lorne Falkenstein and Giovanni Grandi defend the
popular view according to which visible figures, for Reid, are suggested entirely
by retinal impressions, without the aid of any sensation.1 I am not convinced by the
moral they draw from their discussion. In what follows, I explain why I am not.
Despite what Falkenstein and Grandi claim, Reid never simply says that the
perception of visible figure marks an exception to the Standard Schema. Further,
the burden of proof is squarely on the shoulders of those who contend that he
nonetheless thinks it is. After all, Reid offers a general theory of perception in his
description of the Standard Schema. He would have expected his audience to take
him at his word, and thus to take him to hold that the perception of visible figure
also proceeds that way. My article is mostly spent explaining what Reid is really
saying in the passages that are so naturally taken to be claiming the perception of
visible figure to be an exception. Here I want to add just one word about a passage
that Falkenstein and Grandi quote no fewer than five times (pp. 120, 124, 125, 126,
and 128), and which they seem to take to unproblematically support their
interpretation:
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[T]here seems to be no sensation that is appropriated to visible figure, or
whose office it is to suggest it. It seems to be suggested immediately by the
material impression upon the organ, of which we are not conscious… (Reid
1997: 101)
To say that a sensation is not ‘appropriated’ to visible figure and that there is no
sensation ‘whose office’ is to suggest visible figure is to say that there is no
sensation that human beings are given for the purpose of perceiving visible figure.
There is no sensation that has been given the exclusive job, as it were, of sug-
gesting visible figure. This contrasts with the sensation of pressure that has been
given us for the purpose of perceiving hardness and softness in bodies; the
sensation of pressure has no other function. But this isn’t to say that there is no
sensation that suggests visible figure; a sensation could suggest visible figure
without its office being to suggest it. And so it is with sensations of color; they
suggest visible figure even though their primary purpose is to suggest color. So far,
there is no reason to take the passage to support the interpretation that Falkenstein
and Grandi favor. What of the remark that visible figure “seems to be suggested
immediately by the material impression upon the organ”? This remark must be
read in the context of the sentence that precedes it. Reid is occupying the point of
the view of the designer and from this point of view, ‘immediate suggestion’ is just
a synonym for ‘primary purpose’ or ‘office’. Reid is explaining what the designer
uses the retinal impression to suggest, and in saying he uses it to suggest visible
figure “immediately”, he is saying that the retinal impression is given the job of
suggesting visible figure by the designer. Understood any other way, the remark is
simply a non sequitur, that is, it doesn’t amount to the elaboration of the previous
sentence that it is clearly intended to be. And so in saying that retinal impressions
‘immediately suggest’ visible figure, Reid is simply saying that it is something
about the primary function of our retinal impressions, the function they were
immediately given, that tells us that human beings have been designed for the
purpose of perceiving visible figure.
However, the bulk of Falkenstein and Grandi’s article is not directed to textual
matters, but rather to the question of the philosophical merits of the views we
respectively attribute to Reid. Charity dictates that given two interpretations, both
of which are textually consistent, we should prefer the interpretation which ascribes
to Reid the more defensible view. While in my paper I rest very little weight on
considerations of this sort in supporting my interpretation, I do suggest in passing
that the popular view attributes to Reid an implausible theory since it commits him
to denying that there are any differences in sensation in cases in which there are, in
fact, manifest differences. Falkenstein and Grandi attack this claim. They argue,
instead, that not only is the view they attribute to Reid immune to my objection,
but that the view I attribute to him is indefensible. As I’ll show, their objections to
the view I attribute to Reid are actually objections to the Standard Schema in
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general; if their objections succeed, then they also show that Reid must be mis-
taken about how, for instance, the tactile perception of shape proceeds. Thus,
while attending only to the case of the perception of visible figure, they provide
good reasons to think their interpretation more charitable than mine; but when
attending to the whole of Reid’s theory of perception, those very same reasons
show mine to be more charitable than theirs.
Much turns on examples with the following structure: At time t1 I encounter
sign L1 and as a result of this encounter perceive object O to have shape S1. Then
there’s some sort of slight change, and, as a result, at t2 I encounter sign L2 and thus
perceive O to have shape S2. Imagine that the change from t1 to t2 is minimal: all
that changes is the sign that I encounter, and the resulting perception, and whatever
else must change in order to enact those changes. If L1 and L2 are not sensations,
then I do not experience any change in sensation, although I do experience a
change in perception; if they are sensations, then I experience both a change in
sensation and perception. Now imagine that I insist that there was a change in my
sensations from t1 to t2, and cite that as evidence for thinking that L1 and L2 are
sensations. With respect to an example with just this structure, Falkenstein and
Grandi argue that I might be making one of two mistakes (p. 119). I might be
noticing that there is a change in perception and then, in a failure to track Reid’s
famous sensation-perception distinction, I might be calling that a change in
sensation; or I might be inferring that there must have been a change in sensation
given that there was a change in perception. Either way, I’m not justified in
claiming that there was a change in my sensation. Notice that if they are right, then
I’m not in position to assert that there has been a change in my sensation even if
there has been a change in my sensation. Although Falkenstein and Grandi don’t
mean their point to apply to examples beyond the particular example I offer in my
article, their point extends to any example with the same general structure. With
respect to any example of this form, the perceiver can never be in a position to say
whether the change he experiences is a change in sensation, or is just mistakenly
taken by him to be such a change.
Now imagine that I have an ice cube (O) in my palm. At t1 I have a certain
sensation of pressure on my palm (L1) and conceive of the cube as being cubical
(S1). At t2, the ice has melted, I have a different sensation of pressure on my palm
(L2) and conceive of O as being elliptical (S2). When I insist that there has been a
change in my tactile sensation, Falkenstein and Grandi’s point provides me with
grounds for concern about my judgment. Maybe all that’s changed is my percep-
tion and I’m mixing up sensation and perception? After all, there has been a
change in the physical impression on my palm; maybe the physical impression is
the real sign of tangible shape? Would Reid be moved by this concern? Of course
not, for he thinks that it is just introspectively obvious when one has enjoyed a
change in sensation and when one has not. Thus, he would conclude, despite




he would take that as evidence for thinking that sensations, and not physical
impressions, are the signs of tangible shape.
Now return to the example from my paper: At t1 I look through an out of focus
telescope and perceive a barn to be roundish; at t2, after focusing the telescope, I
perceive the barn to be barn-shaped. It seems to me that there has been a change in
my color sensation, although there hasn’t been a change in the color I perceive the
object to have. Falkenstein and Grandi give me reasons to doubt my judgment to
the effect that my sensation has changed, but since those reasons apply just as well
to cases in which I know there’s been a change in sensation (the tactile cases), I’m
unmoved; if, in the tactile case, they don’t convince me I’m mistaken, why should
they convince me in this case? Falkenstein and Grandi are right that there is a way
to describe my example consonant with their interpretation of Reid; doing so
requires insisting that despite what introspection tells me, I’m not actually experi-
encing a change in sensation. But describing it that way would require denying
Reid the sort of description he would give of parallel cases of tactile perception.
So, Falkenstein and Grandi have provided us with a reason why, given Reid’s
sensation-perception distinction, we should be suspicious of appeals to the
deliverances of introspection in describing our sensations. But although their point
may be well-placed, it can’t tell us anything about how Reid is best interpreted.
After all, Reid appeals constantly to introspection and relies on it unwaveringly to
tell him about the nature of his sensations. As he puts the point:
[T]he last appeal, in subjects of this nature, must be to what a man feels and
perceives in his own mind. (Reid 1997: 56)
Falkenstein and Grandi raise another, closely related, point. They suggest that
in order to account for various commonplaces of visual perception, someone who
accepts the view I attribute to Reid must appeal to ‘local signs’; but, they claim,
there is no reason to think there are such things. As they put it, local signs are
“sensations or features of sensations that are specific to the part of the eye or the
particular optic nerve that is affected” (p. 000). Someone who believes that there
are local signs, then, believes that to see a barn-red object in the center of the visual
field feels different from the way it feels to see it on the left. First, note that if local
signs are required to account for the commonplaces Falkenstein and Grandi
mention, then they are also required to account for commonplaces of tactile
perception. If accounting for the fact that objects can change position without
changing color requires appeal to local signs, for instance, then a similar appeal is
required to account for the fact that things can change their tangible position
without change in texture. So, Reid may be committed to the existence of local
signs quite independently of the point in dispute. Still, what reason is there to think
that one shouldn’t believe there are local signs? Falkenstein and Grandi write,
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If we actually experienced local signs we would to be able to answer some
questions about them. We should be able to say if they differ from one
another in degrees, like our sensations of heat, or are instead qualitatively
distinct, like the different hues of colour. If they differ from one another in
degrees, we should be able to say how many dimensions there are to these
differences. Do they differ in just one dimension, like heat and cold; in two,
like sound (pitch and loudness); or in more than two? If they are quali-
tatively distinct, we should be able to count up how many different qualities
there are. We should be able to say if these qualities have a natural order in
which they shade off into one another, like hues of colour, or are entirely
unrelated to one another. Were we actually conscious of local signs, these
questions ought not to embarrass us. (p. 122–3)
Now sensations are almost always distinguished from one another by noting
distinctions between the qualities the sensations suggest. We distinguish the
sensation one has when running one’s hand over a smooth surface from that had
when running one’s hand over a rough surface by saying that the first is a ‘smooth’
sensation, the second a ‘rough’. Sensations, however, are not actually rough or
smooth, so we understand such talk figuratively; such talk marks differences
between sensations that are otherwise difficult to articulate. So, what’s the differ-
ence between the sensation of a barn-red object in the center of one’s visual field
and the sensation of it on the left? Answer: the first is a center-barn-red sensation
and the second is a left-barn-red sensation. (Analogously, what’s the difference
between the sensation of a square object in the center of one’s palm, and the
sensation of it in the left of one’s palm?) To require a more helpful description of
the difference between the two sensations would be to impose a higher standard on
our descriptions of visual sensations than we require of our descriptions of tactile
sensations. Perhaps such a high standard is appropriate in both cases, but, if so,
then the reasons given for thinking that there are no local visual sensations would
also support the contention that there are no tactile sensations.
Again, Falkenstein and Grandi’s objection, if successful, commits them to an
objection to the view, that it is agreed Reid holds, that tactile perception takes
place in accordance with the Standard Schema. So, even if their objection is suc-
cessful, charity does not thereby dictate acceptance of their interpretation over
mine. Quite the reverse: given that Reid accepts that tactile perception takes place
in accordance with the Standard Schema, he either wasn’t concerned by, or (more
likely) didn’t anticipate the sorts of objections that Falkenstein and Grandi raise;
so, there’s no reason to expect him to tailor his theory of visual perception so as to
avoid them.2 So, although Falkenstein and Grandi have made important progress
on the project of assessing Reid’s theory of perception – they have provided chal-
lenges to the Standard Schema, especially as a description of tactile perception,




shown that Reid takes the perception of visible figure to mark an exception to the
Standard Schema. Visual sensations, just like tactile, are difficult to distinguish in
introspection from the perceptions to which they give rise. Once we do so, however,
we can recognize that their office is to suggest color and to suggest visible figure
only by coincidence; this helps us to see that it is really the office of the retinal
impression to help us to see visible figure. But since it is something’s office to do
so, contra Berkeley, visible figure has as much reason to be considered real, and
thus the object of a genuine science, as tangible figure does. At least, so Reid holds.
NOTES
11 I’m grateful to Falkenstein for a very profitable e-mail exchange and for helpful
comments on this reply.
12 Falkenstein and Grandi also argue ad hominem that if what Reid really cared about, as I
contend, was to show that the human mind was expressly designed to perceive visible
figure (a claim which they deny), he could have argued for this conclusion even given
their view of the manner through which the perception of visible figure proceeds. They
are right that he could have so argued. However, all the texts that purportedly support
Falkenstein and Grandi’s position are texts in which Reid is offering the argument for the
claim that human beings are expressly designed to perceive visible figure. Given that
there are no other texts in which he says that the perception of visible figure marks an
exception to the Standard Schema, mine is the more parsimonious, and hence the better,
interpretation of the argument.
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